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[Crim. No. 5421. ID BaDk. I'e1t. 18, 1954.)

THE PEOPLE, Respondent,

'Y.

GEORGE H. ASHLEY,

Appellant.
[1] False PreteDa-DtstfDpIahecl !'rom La.rce.D7 ~ 1frict an4
Device.-Larceny by trick and devioe is appropriation of property the possession of which w.. fraudulentlJ acquired,
wbereaa obtaining property by false pretenses is fraudulent

)

or deceitful aequisition of both title and possession.
[i] La.rcenJ'-Ueet of StatuteDelniq 'rheft-Elements Unchanged.-Althougb oifenses of lareeny by trick and device and
obtaining property by false pretenses, with other larcenous
mimes, have been consolidated into single crime of theft (Pen.
Code, 1484), their elements have not been changed.
(3] Id.-Purpose and Ejfeet of Statute De1lD1q 'rhef\-Parpose
of consolidation of the several larcenous crimes into single
mime of theft (Pen. Code, 1484) was to remove technicalities
that existed in pleading and proof of these mimea at common
law; indictments and informations eharging "theft" oan now
.unply allege an "1Ullawful taking" (Pen. Code, 11951, 952),
and juries need no longer be concerned with technical di1ferences between several types of theft but can return a general
verdict of guilty if they find that an "1Ullawful taking" has
been proved.
.
[4] ld.-meet of Statute Delniq 'rhef~E1ements uJlCh&Dp(LJudgment of conviction of theft based on general verdict of
guilty oan be sustained only it evidence discloses elements of
one of eonsolidated ojfensee.
[5] False Pretenses - Elements. -Where evidence in prosecution for grand theft shows that each prosecuting witness intended to pass both title and possession of money and property
[1] Bee Oat..Tur., False Pretenses, 113: Am..Tur.,False Pretensee,

13·

MeE. D1c. Befereneea: [1] False Pretenses, 12; [2-4] Larceny,
13; [6] False Pretenses, 13; [6] False Pretenses, 169; [7,9] False
Pretenses, 16; [8] False Pretenses, 116; [10, 26, 27] False Pretenses, 140; [11] FraUd, § 12; [12, 18] False Pretenses, 11; [13,
22,23] False Pretenses, 137(1); [14, 15, 191 False Pretenses, 114;
(16] False Pretenses, 1114, 42; [17] Conspiracy, 15; False Pretenses, 11; [20] Criminal Law, 1658; [21] False Pretenses, 141;
[24) False Pretenses, §37(5); [25] False Pretenses, § 47; [28-30]
Witnesses, § 19; [31] Criminal Law, § 968: [32] Criminal Law,
§ 969; [33J Criminal Law, § 970(6); [34J Criminal Law, 1106;
[35] Criminal Law, § 105; [36] False Pretenses, § 19; [37} Criminal
Law, 11459; [38] Criminal Law, 1264; [39] Criminal Law. 1611.
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to person to whom she delivered possession, type of theft, if
aDY, was that of obtaining property by false pretenses.
IS] Id.-Appea1-Harm,le81 Error -hstructions.-Although eviace in prosecution .for graud theft shows that type of
theft, if aDY, was that of obtainiDg property by false preteDSeS, defendaDt wu not prejudiced by aD instruction relatinIs to lareeuy by trick aDd device where he requested instructions relating to both lareeDy by trick and device aDd obtaining
property by false pretenses, and where hia defense wu not
based on distinctions betweeu title and possession but on eon~ntion that there was no unlawful tamg of aDy sort.
[7] Id.-Elements-Representation 01' Pretense.-To support •
conviction of dleft for obtaining property by false pretenses,
it must be shown that defendant made a false pretense or
represeutation with intent to defraud owner of his property,
.oDd that owner was in fact defrauded.
[8] Id. - Elementa - 'banafer.-In prosecution for graud theft
based on obtaining property by false pretenses, it is unneces18!')' to prove that defendaDt beueflted personally from fraudu!ent acquisition.
. [9] 1d.-EIements-Representation or Pretense.-While false pretense or representation must have materially influenced owner
to ilart with hia property, it need not be sole inducing cause.
[10] Id.-Eridenc&-Proof of Pretense-Oorroboration.-If conviction rests primarily on testimony of single witness that
false pretense W38 made, the makiDg of such pretense must be
.,
eorroborated. (Pen. Code, § 1l10.)
-, [11] Fraud-Promise Kade With htent not to Perform.-False
;
promises CaD provide foundation of a civil action for deceit
';
(Civ. coae, §§ 1512, subd. (4), lnO, subd. (4), but in It-.1ch
.,
actions something more tban nonperformance is required to
prove defendaDt's intent not to perform his I'Tomise.
". [12] False PreteJUel - EIementa - R8presentatioll or Pretense.
Promi8e.-Proof of nonperformance alone is insufIlcient ill
~'.
eriminal prosecutions based on false promisee.
[18] Id.-Evidence.-In criminal prosecutions based on false prom_!~. iaee the People must prove their ease beyond • reaaonable
.'",. . doubt.
. [14] Id.-Blementa-htent.-The problem of proving intent when
-,
false pretense is .. false promise is no more diftlcult thaD when
,. false pretense ia misrepresentation of existing fact.
~ [16] 1d.-EIements-htent and Enowledge.-In eases of obtaining
property by false pretenses, it must be proved that any mis~

~)

/
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representations of fact alleged by the People were made
knowingly and with intent to deceive.
[16] ld.-Elements-Intent: Instructions.-Whether pretense is a
false promise or is a misrepresentation of fact, defendant's intent must be proved by something more than mere proof of
nonperformance or actual falsity, and defendant is entitled to
have jury instructed to that effect.
[17] OonspiracJ'-OrimiDal-Particular Conspiracies: False Pretenaes-Representation-Promise.-Pen. Code, § 182, subd. 4,
relating to conspiracies to obtain money or property "by false
pretenses or by false promises," does not indicate that Legislature did not regard falstl promises as "false pretenses"
within meaning of Pen. Code, §§ 484, 532, defining crime of
obtaining property by false pretenses, but merely indicates
that such words were probably added out of abundance of
lIaution to insure carrying out of legislative purpose to include
all such aets within scope of § 182; omission of comma af~r
"false pretenses," as quoted above, also indicates that Legislature did not set either "false pretenses" or "false promises"
apart from the other as a separate class of crime but regarded
them as same kind of crime.
[18] False Pretenses >~ Elements - Representation or Pretense
-Promise.-IncluSion of false promises within Pen. Code,
55 484, 532, defining crime of obtaining. property by false pretenses, will not materially encumber business a1Iairs.
[19] ld.-Elements-Intent.-Ordinary commercial defaults can40t be subject of criminal prosecution, for essence of obtaining property by false pretenses is fraudulent intent of defendant.
[20] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Weight of Testimony.-It is for jury to sift true from false, to determine
credibility of witnesses and weight to be given testimony of
an individual witness, even if it is inconsistent.
[21] False Pretenses-Questions of Law and Fact.-Where nyear-old prosecuting witness in prosecution for theft by false
pretenses testifled that defendant told her that "they" owned
certain property, that loan was made directly to defendant,
that corporation which defendant represented "was not brought
into this at all," and that she relied on his representation of
ownership of property, these matters were for jury to consider
in determining weight to be given her testimony, it being possible that pronouns were interchanged owing to knowledge
later acquired, a slip of the tongne, or to fact that defendant
and corporatioD had become ODe in her mind.
[22] ld.-Evidence.-The fact that prosecuting witness in prosecution for theft by false pretenses refused to admit her signature
to letter acknowledging receipt of note and t.ruat deed .....
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immaterial to main issue and went merely to her credibility
as a witness where this !etter was not written by her, and
where she refused to acknowledge letter or her signature because letter stated that she had received a note prior to one
whose receipt was acknowledged in letter.
(23] Id.-Evidence.-Testimony in prosecution for theft by false
pretenses that prosecuting witness was frightened when defendant took gun from drawer and placed it on top of desk
did not prove that crime was extortion rather than theft,
wh.,re money had previou,;ly been advanced to defendant in
reliance on his false representations, and gun episode accomplished no more than an exchange of promissory notes, giving
an outward appolarance of regularity to transection whereby
money was previously acquired.
[24] Id.-Evidence.-An implied finding that money had been
acquired with felonious intent is sustained by evidence that
defendant, f\S head of an organization, deliberately set out to
acquire life savings of his victims, one a woman nearing 70
and the other a woman of little education and rural background, that women were won over by 1lattering offers of positions in organization and false promises of security for their
10SJlb, and thereafter held in line by importunate and then
menacing supplications.
(25] Id.-Appeal-~uestions of Law and Fact.-In prosecution
for theft by false pretenses, it is duty of reviewing court to
examine evidence to determine whether corroboration required
by statute (Pen. Code, § 1110) has been presented; the weight
of such evidence is for jury.
[26] Id.-Evidence - Proof of Pretense - Corroboration.-Testimony of prosecuting witness in prosecution for theft by false
pretenses that she' had been promised a first mortgage on cer.,a,in property is corroborated, among other things, by evidence
~at she was given a second trust deed on property, the giving
of such trust deed being indicative of a prior promise to give
..ecurity.
[27J Id.-Evidence-Proof of Pretense-Corroboratton.-The fact
that defendant has made same or similar representation to
another, although at a diiIerent time and place, is a corroborating circumstance, in prosecution for obtaining property by
false pretenses, and testimony of one prosecuting witness may
be corroborated by that of another, where similar representations were made to each.
'[28] Witnesses-Duty to Testify-Hect of Failure to Testify.A defendant's failure to take the stand to deny or explain evidence presented against him, when it is in his power to do so,
may be considered by jury as tending to indicate truth of such
evidence, and as indicating that among inferences that may
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reasonably be drawn therefrom, those unfavorable to defendant
are more probable.
[29] Id.-DutJ to Testify-Effect of Failure to Testify.-Defendant's failure to testify will not supply a lacuna in prosecution's proof.
[80] Id.-DutJ to Testify-Effect of Failure to Testify.-In criminal cases, after prosecution haa made a prima facie case,
defendant's failure to testify is not affirmative evidence of any
fact, and any inference that can in the circumstances be justly
drawn therefrom is persuasive rather than probative, lending
weight to evidence presented by prosecu~on.
[81] Oriminal Law-New Tr1aJ-Time of Bearin, aDd Oontinuances.-Where three continuances of hearing on motion for
new trial were granted at request of defendant's counsel and
hearing was then set for designated date on de1inite understanding that motron was then to be heard and decided, on
which day counsel argued motion at length and aBnounced
that other parts of motion were in process of preparation by
defendant who needed time to secure signatures to affidavits,
it was proper to grant a continuance on condition that there
would be no further oral argument.
[32] Id.-New Trial--Bearing-Argument.-If trial court misconceives or refuses to do its duty with reference to a motion
for a new trial and denies reasonable opportunity for oral
argument, a new trial must be granted: but where trial judge,
despite remarks indicating impatience. carefully read and
considered affidl'vits presented and called for originals of
documents mentioned therein. and where affidavits ftled by
defendant were in effeet oral argument presented in written
form, a fair and impartial bearin,:t on motion waa had.
[33] Id.-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence.-It was not an
abuse of discretion to deny a motion for new trial on ground
of newly discovered evidence where the documents presented
as newly discovered evidence were either manufactured and
signature thereon procured by stratagem or were cumulative,
denied by cODnteraffida'l"its. and came from unreliable sources.
[34] Id. - Rights \)f Accused - Oonfrontation by WitnessesWaiver.-The right of defendant to be confronted by witnesses
at his trial may be waived.
[36] Id.-&ights of Accused-Oonfrontation by Witnesses.-Tbe
right of defendant to be confronted by witnesses is preserved
to him in adva.ltage he once had of seeing witness face-to-face
and of subjecting him to ordeal of cross-examination, and
defendant is not deprived of such right, where he had that
[34J See Oal.Jur., Criminal Law, §§ 76, 77; Am.Jur., Criminal

Law, 1188.

Feb. 19541

PEOPLE V. ASHLEY
142 C.2d 246: 267 P.2d 2711

251

advantage at preliminary hearing, by the reading of witness'
testimony as given at preliminary hearing.
[36] False Pretenses-Separate Crimes.-Where proof in a given
ease is sufficient to show existence of fraudulent intent or purpose on part of accused to obtain property from another by
false or fraudulent representations, the making of ftrst false
representations which moved or induced person to whom they
were made to part with his property does not immunize defrauding person from punishment for subsequently obtaindlg from such person other property which was parted with
under influence of fraudulent representations which were still
operating on mind of defrauded person at time he passed his
Droperty into hands of such designing person.
[37J Criminal Law-Successive Crimes.-A conviction of eonspiraC!y to use the mails to defraud is a prior conviction within
our statutes (Pen. Code, §§ 969b, 3024, subd. (c», and fact
that minimum term of sentence is thereby increased does not
render the law unconstitutional.
[38] Id.-Trial-Conduct of Trial.-It is not only the right but the
duty o~ trial judg-e so to supervise and regulate course of trial
that truth shall be revealed so far as it may be. within established rules of evidence.
(89J Id.-Argument of Counsel.-District attorney was not guilty
of misconduct in his argument to jury in prosecution for
theft by false pretenses when he said that prosecuting witness
waf "robbed" ot security of her second trust deed at a later
time, where jury was aware that no charge to that effect was
"j
involved and that quoted word was used in colloquial rather
than legal sense, and where jury was properly cautioned.

t

i

t' APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of

Los

Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
:William B. Neeley. Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for grand theft.
firmed.

Judgment of conviction af-

;' George H. A!;hley. in pro. per., Wallace E. Wolfe. Jr.•
under appointment b~' the Supreme Court, and Benjamin D.
~Brown. for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
" TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was convicted of four counts of
ITand theft under section 484 of the Penal Code. He c, appeals
m the verdicts and judgments as to each count," and
......·dss,.;nc his motion kr a .........

,
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The first two counts charged that defendant feloniously
took $13,590 from Mrs. Maude Nealon June 19, 1948, and
$4,470 from her on August 3, 1948. The remaining two
counts charged that he feloniously took $3,000 from Mrs.
Mattie Russ on November 19, 1948, and $4,200 from her on
December 4, 1948.
Defendant was the "business manager" of "Life's Estate,
Ltd., " a corporation chartered for the purpose of •• introducing people." Although defendant did run, and had full
authority to run the affairs of tJ.e corporation, its capital
stock was owned by Mrs. Edith Wingrave, defendant's sisterin-law, and Mr. and Mrs. Leo Butts, defendant's son-in-law
and daughter. Mrs. Wing rave and the Buttses were also the
officers and directors of the corporation.
.
In the latter part of 1948 Mrs. Russ, then about 70 years
of age, visited the offices of Life's Estate at 1537 North
La Brea Avenue in Hollywood. She was introduced to defendant, who persuaded her to join the "Life's Estate Philosophical Society. U On November 18, 1948, in response to a
telegraphic invitation, she returned to the La Brea offices and
was offered a position as matron and hostess at a salary of
$100 a month with a rent-free apartment on the property.
She accepted the offer. As defendant was driving Mrs.
Russ to her home in Long Beach, he went by a lot on Sunset
Boulevard on which stood two sheet metal buildings. De.
fendant told her that •• he owned that property and they also
owned the La Brea property at 1537." As they drove on, defendant asked Mrs. Russ if she had any ready cash. When she
told him that she had $3.000 he explained that he was building
a theater on the Sunset property and needed money to proceed with the construction. He offered her interest at the
rate of 6 per cent and security in the form of a first mortgage
or trust deed on the La Brea property. Mrs. Russ agreed to
make the loan and to go with defendant to her bank the following morning. When they arrived at the bank, defendant
refused to go in with Mrs. Russ. She entered alone and
secured $3,000 in currency from a safe deposit box. Defendant then took her in his automobile to a bank in Westchester, a suburb of Los Angeles. On arrival at this bank
she turned the money over to defendant in reliance on his
representations that she would get a first mortgage on the
La Brea property and that the money would be used in the
construction of a theater on the Sunset Boulenrd lot, which
she believed he owned. Defendant gave her a receipt for the

)
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money, which stated that she was to receive a first trust deed
on the La Brea property. The money was deposited to the
account of Life's Estate at the Westchester Branch of the
Security-First National Bank. The corporation's books show
that on that day the cash account was subject to an overdraft
of $4,151.93.
After this transaction was completed, defendant took Mrs.
Russ to the offices of Life's Estates and later to dinner. At
dinner he told her that he needed more money to complete
the theater building and asked her to make an additional loan.
She said that she had a note, secured by a trust deed and
a chattel mortgage, worth $4,200 that she had acquired from
the sale of the home in which she had previously lived. She
agreed to transfer these documents to defendant. This loan
and the previous one of $3,000 were to be consolidated, and
he agreed to give her a first mortgage for the full amount
against the La Brea property. On November 20, 1948,
, defendant drove Mrs. Russ once again to her bank, which
held the documents and acted as her agent for the collection
of installments. Again defendant insisted that she enter
-, the bank alone. After securing the documents, Mrs. Russ
suggested that they return to the bank and have the bank's
employees prepare the transfer, but defendant insisted that
the necessary papers could be prepared in his office. The
transfer was made that day. It was stipulated that the note
secured by the trust deed and chattel mortgage was sold by
defendant and the proceeds of the sale deposited to the account of Life's Estate. They were used for the operating
expenses of the corporation.
On November 25, 1948, Mrs. Russ moved into an apartment at the La Brea property and undertook the duties of
matron and hostess. She testified that her many requests
for the promised first mortgage were unavailing and that she
returned to defendant her receipt for the $3,000, when he
; told her that she would receive the mortgage if she did 80.
After frequent quarrels over the failure to deliver the
mortgage and over the tasks assigned her, Mrs. Russ left the
employ of Life's Estate on March 31, 1949. At this time she
received a note of the corporation secured by a second trust
deed on unimproved property in Nichols Canyon owned by
the corporation. Mrs. Russ testified that, although this
.aecurity was worthless to her, she took it because defendant
. bad tokl her to "take that or noth.ina."

t;
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It was proved that the Sunset property was owned by the
corporation and that no theater was ever built thereon. The
La Brea property was owned by Dr. Louis Phillips. who
had leased the property to Mrs. Wingrave for a period of five
years. He had not authorized anyone to place an encumbrance
On this property.
Mrs. Russ testified that she did not receive a note prior
to the one accompanying the second deed of trust on the
Nichols Canyon property. When shown a letter, signed by
her. acknowledging receipt of the note and second deed of
trust and agreeing to cancel and return a prior note, she reo
fused to admit that the signature was hers, because of the
reference to the prior note. It was stipulated that the signa·
ture was genuine.
Thereafter. Mrs. Russ made a number of smaller loans to
defendant. Sh(' testified that the loans were made in respoI!se
to appeals that they were necessary to maintain public utility
service and the like. All of these loans were repaid. In
payment of the loans of $3.000 and $4.200 Mrs. Russ received
four postdated checks drawn by Life's Estate. After it had
become clear that these checks would not be paid. defendant
drov(' Mrs. Russ to a high point in Nichols Canyon and asked
for an extension of time Mrs. Russ was frightened by their
proximity to the edge of a steep embankment. Earl Farns·
worth. an employee of Life's Estate. met them on the road as
defendant had instructed him to do. He testified that he de·
livered an envelope to defendant. who opened it and gave
Mrs. Russ the contents. a promissory note payable six months
from date. She finally agreed to an extension but said that
she wanted the time shortened. After pleading that he
couldn't raise the money in any shorter length of time. de·
fendant finally agreed to change the term of the note from
six to four months. He made the change. (rave the note to
Mrs. Russ and told Farnsworth to return and pick up his
remains. Mrs. Russ testified that she consented to thE' ex·
tE'nsion because she w&..<; fri(rhtened by defendant's drivin!Z <;0
near to the edge of a sheer slope and by his threats to take
his own life so that she might be paid from the procE'eds
of his life insurance policies.
In support of the two counts charging defendant with
(rrand theft from Mrs. MaudE' NE'al the People introduced
the testimony of Mrs. Neal at the preliminary hearing", sinee
she had returned to her North Carolina home and was not
available at the time of the triaL

)

:)

rg.

F::95;~ beeam~=':"::;:~ Estate throng:":

t,·.
, newspaper advertisement and Leo Butta called to seU her
r. a membership. She later went to the La Brea oftice, where
Mrs. Wingrave introduced her to defendant. After lOme
preliminary conversation be asked her if she owned any
· property. She replied that she owned $17,500 worth of war
bonda. Be learned that the bonds were kept in • lock-box in
· Mrs. Neal's home in North Carolina. Defendant then introduced Mrs. Neal to Dr. IDy8Be8 Meyer. a psychologist associated
with Life's Estate. After some further talk. Mrs. Neal signed
• note for $40 and became a member.
Between March and June of 1948. defendant and Mrs.
Neal had a number of conversations regarding her money.
·.She was offered a position as matron and bostess with aD
· apartment rent-free if she would let him have aU her money.
,'. Be stated that he wanted ber money to take up an option
that he had to buy the El Patio Theater for $165.000. which
he said was worth $500.000. Defendant said that be would
, give Mrs. Neal a note of Life's Estate and a trust deed on the
theater building. She was unable to decide whether to make
the loan. but offered to have ber bopds ttlailed to ber, De. fendant insisted that this method was too slow and prevailed
· upon her to telepbone ber daughter to send the bonds by
'airmail. After receiving the bonds. Mrs. Neal went to the
office of Life's Estate and talked to defendant. When she
reintroduced the subject of security, be flew into a rage. saying that she talked as though she did not trust him. She
'eaUed on Dr. Meyer. told him of the conversation. and then
left with ber bonds. At 10 o'clock that night. Leo Butta
'ulled for her and she went with him to the offices at La Brea,
'where she met defendant. Be said that Dr. Meyer had told
liim that she was afraid to let them have her money, and
'that be was lOrry if be had given ber the impression that
~ey were not honest. Be again told her that she would have
'iood security for her loan beCJluse the corporation was ....orth
• half-million dollars and bad $125,000 worth of equipment
the building alone. After lOme further conversation she
:agreed to make a loan.
On the next day, June 19, 1948, defendant ealled for Mn.
~'Neal and drove her to the Inglewood Branch of the Security::first National Bank. Some of the bonds were not redeemable
• a bank, 80 Mrs. Neal obtained only $13,590 at this time.
purehaaed a eashier'. check for the &moot, endoned it

m
o
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and gave it to defendant, who endorsed it and deposited it
to the account of Life's Estate on the same day. Mr. Nelson
of the Security-First National Bank testified that he had a
conversation with defendant and Mrs. Neal at this time, and
they told him that the money was needed to make a down
payment on the EI Patio Theater. Mrs. Neal was then taken
to a bank in Westchester, to which she moved her bank account at defendant's request. The remaining bonds were
turned over to this bank to be forwarded to the Department
of the Treasury for redemption. Mrs. Neal testified that she
had never agreed to lend the money that was to be realized
from these bonds.
Mrs. Neal received a note from Life's Estate for $13,500,
but did not receive the deed of trust. An escrow for the
purchase by Life's Estate of the EI Patio Theater was opened
at the Westchester Branch of the Security-First N",tional
Bank with a deposit of $5,000 on June 23, 1948. The escrow
was closed and the deposit was withdrawn on July 13, 1948.
Defendant'8 attorney testified that the purchase was cancelled by agreement, after defendant had unsuccessfully attempted to secure a reduction in the purchase price, because
the motion picture projection booth would have to be remodelled to conform to fire regulations, and because of encroachments and easements that would be exempted from the
policy of title insurance.
.
Mrs. Neal testified that, so far as she knew, the purehase
had taken place when she went to the La Brea office of Life's
Estate on August 3, 1948. There she found a check for
$4,470, naming her as payee, which had been sent to the
La Brea address in payment for the bonds transmitted through
the Westchester bank. Mrs. Neal endorsed the check, but
did not take possession of it. It was subsequently deposited
to the account of Life's Estate. After waiting until the
offices were empty, defendant said that he wished to speak to
her in his office. He offered her a new note for $17,500, but
she said that she did not want to give him the rest of her
money because she might need' it to buy a car or to make a
down payment on a home. After she had refused an offer
of a car as a token of appreciation, defendant took Ii gun from
a drawer, placed it on the desk, and said, "Now look here,
Mrs. Neal. I don't want no monkey business out of you. Do
you understand thatf" Frightened by defendant's demeanor
and the presence of the gun, Mrs. Neal picked up the new
note ad returned the $13,500 note.

-)
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,', . Sometime after the events just related, defendant told Mrs.
Neal that the theater building had been condemned and that
the deal had fallen through. The record also discloses that
Mrs. Neal consulted an attorney, but no action W88 taken.
;. She had received only $649.49 in interest on her loans at the
time of trial.
Witnesses for the defense presented a completel1 ditterent
'Version of the facts. Leo Butts testified that each of the
.women had voluntarily offered to make unsecured loans to
corporation. The offers were made to the corporation'.
vw.CC;~lII, who accepted them. It was stipulated that Mrs. Butts
testify similarly. There was also testimony that Mrs.
must have known that the La Brea property W88 owned
Dr. Phillips, that Mrs. Neal had advised cancellation of
EI Patio purchase in the early part of July and had rean offer to return her money. and that she had been 80
to lend the proceeds from her bonds that she called
Butts to take her to the office at 9 :30 p. m., whereupon
. took her there, and the transaction was completed in his

i

/

There is little evidence concerning the financial standing
the corporation or defendant's participation in the profits.
incorporation took place in DeCember of 1947, when
were only 100 members. Capital stock of a face value
$25,000 was issued, but the corporation did not receive all
this amount in cash. Extensive improvements on the leased
property were paid for by the corporation. Leo Butts
IJeStiJlled that the membership had increased to approximately
at the time the loans were made, but that only UO was
for each membership, an insufticient amount in view
high expenses. Thereafter the fees were raised to a
[aximu:m of $100. Butts also testified that the corporation
not aflord to pay defendant a salary, and that he
"his business knowledge to our small organization."
admitted, however. that defendant drove a Lincoln
[Q,tomolblle bought by the corporation. and had received and
nu:merous checks for expenses. The fact that the
!i!Stda1~ checks given to Mrs. Russ in payment of one of
loans eould not be met, and that the l()ans of both Mrs.
and Mrs. Neal were used to meet overdrafts or for the
operating expenses of the corporation, indicates that
corporation was havin~ finaneiRl c1iflicnlties.
case went to the jury with instructions relatiDa to
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larceny by trick and device and obtaining property by false
pretenses. The jurors were instructed that all would have
to agree on the type of theft, if any, that was committed. De.
fendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support
a conviction of either type of theft, that the general verdict
of guilty was unlawful, and that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a new trial on these grounds.
[1] Although the crimes of larceny by trick and device
and obtaining property by false pretenses are much alike,
they are aimed at different criminal acquisitive techniques.
Larceny by trick and device is the appropriation of property,
the possession of which was fraudulently acquired; obtaining
property by false pretenses is the fraudulent or deceitful
acquisition of both title and possession. (See PeopZB v. Delbos,
146 CaL 734, 736-737 [81 P. 131] ; 12 Cal.Jur., "False Pretenses, ' , § 13.) [2] In this state, these two offenses, ,with
other larcenous crimes, have been consolidated into the single
crime of theft (Pen. Code, § 484). but their elements have
not been changed thereby. (People v. Myers, 206 Cal. 480.
483-485 [275 P. 219] ; PeopZB v. Jones, 36 Cal.2d 373. 376377 [224 P.2d 353] ; People v. 8elk, 46 Cal.App.2d 140. 147
[115 P.2d 607].) [3] The purpose of the consolidation was
to remove the technicalities that existed in the pleading
and proof of these crimes at common law. Indictments and
informations charging the crime of "theft" can now simply
allege an "unlawful taking." (Pen. Code, §§ 951, 952.) Juries
need no longer be concerned with the technical differences
between the several types of theft, and can return a general
verdict of guilty if they find that an "unlawful taking" has
been proved. (People v. Plum, 88 Cal.App. 575, 581-582
[263 P. 862, 265 P. 322] ; PeopZB v. Myers, 206 Cal. 480, 484
{275 P. 219] ; PeopZB v. Fewkes, 214 Cal. 142, 149 [4 P.2d
538] ; see, also, PeopZB v. Palmer, 92 Cal.App. 323, 326 (268
P.417].) [4] The elements of the several types of theft included within section 484 have not been changed, however.
and a judgment of conviction of theft, based OD a general
verdict of guilty, can be sustained only if the evidence dis·
closes the elements of one of the consolidated offenses. (People
v. Nor Woods, 37 Ca1.2d 584, 586 [233 P.2d 897].) [0] In
the present case, it is clear from the record that each of the
prosecuting witnesses intended to pass both title and possession, and that the type of theft, if any, in each case, W88 that
of obtaining property by false pretenses. [6] Defendant
was not prejudiced by the instruction to the jurI relatins to
I
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larceny by trick and device. Indeed, he requested instruotions relating to both larceny by trick and device and obtaining property by false pretenses. Moreover, his defense was
not based on distinctions between title and possession, but
rather he contends that there was no unlawful taking of aJJ7
IOrt.
['1] To support a conviction of theft for obtaining prop, erty by false pretenses, it must be shown that the defendant
made a false pretense or representation with intent to defraud the owner of his property, and that the owner was in
fact defrauded. [8] It is unnecessary to prove that the
defendant benefited personally from the fraudulent acquisition. (People v. Jones, 36 Ca1.2d 373, 377, 881 [224 P.2d
~ 8531.) [9] The false pretense or representation must have
: materially influenced the owner to part with his property, but
I the false pretense need not be the sole inducing cause. (People
•..•• Chamberlain, 96 Cal.App.2d 178, 182 [214 P.2d 6001 and
f.eases there cited.) [10] If the conviction rests primarily
'on the testimony of a single witness that the false pretense
:'was made, the making of the pretense must be corroborated.
t(Pen. Code, § 1110.)
The crime of obtaining property by false pretenses was
unknown in the early common law (see Young v. The King,
. 8 T.R. 98, 102 [1789]), and our statute, like those of most
. American states, is directly traceable to 30 Geo. fi, chapter
24, section 1 (22 Statutes-at-Large 114 [17571 ).1 In an early
'Crown Case Reserved, Be~ v. Gooa:h4Zl, Russ. & Ry. 461
':(1821), the defendant obtained a quantity of meat from a
~ merchant by promising to pay at a future date. The jury
"found that the promise was made without intention to perfform. The judges concluded, however, that the defendant'.
~eonviction was erroneous because the pretense "was merely a
~: romise of future conduct, and common prudence and caution
•. . '
d have prevented any injury arising from it." (Russ. &
... ' • at 463.) The correctness of this decision is questionable
, ,~ light of the reasoning in an earlier decision of the King'.
~Bench (Young v. The King, supra--not mentioned in Be~ ••
:GoodhaZZ). By stating that the "promise of future conduct"
;Was such that cc common prudenc'! and caution" could prevent

t

E

f

'Thia statute provided, in pnrt, that • Call persons who knowingl,. and
b,. false pretence orpretenees, shall obtain from an,. persoll
mone,., goods, ,ures or merchandizes, with intent to cheat or
i41efraud any person or pemon! of the same • • • shall be deemed oflenden
~ law &ad the publick peace. •••" (CI. P ... CocJe, .531.)
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any injury arising therefrom, the new o«ense was confused
with the old common law "cheat." The decision also seems
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.' and was so
interpreted by two English writers on the law of crimes.
(Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 183
[3d ed., 1828]; Roscoe, Digest of the Law of Evidence iD
Criminal Cases 418 [2d Amer. eel, 1840].) The opinion in
Bez v. GoodkalZ, supra, was completely misinterpreted in the
ease of Commonwealth v. Drew (1837), 36 Mass. (19 Pick.)
179, in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
declared (at 185), by way of dictum, that under the statute
"naked lies" could not be regarded as "false pretences." On
the basis of these two questionable decisions, Wharton formulated the following generalization: ". . . the false pretense
to be within the statute, must relate to a state of things averred
to be at the time existing, and not to a state of things thueafter to exist." (Wharton, American Criminal Law 542 [1st
ed., 1846].) This generalization has been followed in the
majority of American eases, almost all of which can be traced
to reliance on Wharton or the two cases mentioned above.
(Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697; PeopZs v. Karp,
298 N.Y. 213 [81 N.E.2d 817); Steely v. Commonwealth. 171
Ky. 58 [186 S.W. 883) ; but see Commonwealth v. Murphy,
96 Ky. 28 [27 S.W. 859] ; State v. Pe,."." 171 Ind. 562, 564- .
565 [86 N.E. 993]; PeopZs v. Orris, 52 Colo. 244 [121 P.
1631 ; Sta,t, v. 81&etllin, 81 N.H. 121 [123 A. 233] ; StGle v.
Knoff, 124 N.C. 814 [32 S.E. 798) ; Spriggs v. Craig, 36 N.D.
160, 162 [161 N.W. 1007] ; State v. Bowd, 55 Utah 527, 533
[188 P. 628} ; Prank v. State. 244 Wis. 658 [12 N.W.2d 9231 ;
State v. Biggins, 148 Tenn. 609 [256 S.W. 875]; Commonwealth v. Moore, 99 Pa. 570. 574: State v. Alick, 62 S.D .. 220
[252 N.W. 644]; Wharton on Criminal Law, § 1439 (12th ed.,
1932) ; Clark and Marshall on Crimes. § 359 (5th ed., 1952);
168 A.L.R. 835-837.) The rule has not been followed in all
jurisdictions, however. Some courts have avoided the problems created by the rule by blurring the distinctions between
larceny by trick and device and obtaining property by false
pretenses. (See generally, Pearce. UTheft by Palse Promises,"
101 n.of Pa.L.Rev. 967: and see the development in the follThe word "pretence" in the middle of the eighteenth eentury was
apparentl1 a 87Jlonym for the words '~purpose" and "intention." as
wen as the words (more eommon toda1) "pretext" or "misrepresentation." Bee 8 The Oxford English Dietionary 1326, eol. 1 (1933). See,
also, Webster'. New International Diction&r7 11159, coL 1 (2cl ed..
1H8).
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lowing New York cases: Loom18 v. People, 67 N.Y. 322 [23
Am.Rep. 123]; Zink v. People, 77 N.Y. 114 [33 Am.Rep.
589J; People v. Miller, 169 N.Y. 339, 349-355 [62 N.E. 418,
t 88 Am.St.Rep. 546]; People v. Noblett, 244 N.Y. 355, 358l 865 [155 N.E. 670J ; People v. Karp, 75 N.Y.S.2d 169 [273
t App.Div. 779J. However, the decision in People v. Karp,
[ m-pra, holding that" [i)rrespective of the promissory nature
~ of the representation .•., it was larceny," was reversed on
~
t appeal. The old distinctions were reestablished, and obtaining
~ property by false promises was held not indictable. People
t v. Karp, 298 N.Y. 213 [81 N.E.2d 817). A development
~ similar to that in the New York cases took place in a series
I of decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals: see
~. Rundell v. State, 90 Tex.Crim.Rep. 410 [235 S.W. 908);
j Contreras v. State, 118 Tex.Crim. Rep. 626 [39 S.W.2d 62);
De Blanc v. State, 118 Tex.Crim.Rep. 628 [37 S.W.2d 1024) ;
Whitehead v. State, 148 Tex.Crim.Rep. 190 [185 S.W.2d
~I"'. ' 7.2.5) ; cf. peOPle. v. Wetoert, 18 Cal.App.2d 457, 462464 [64
'P.2d 169).} Other courts have repudiated the majority rule
'. (State v. McMahon, 49 R.t. 107, 108 [140 A. 359) ; Common;;, tDealt1r. v. Morrison, 252 Mass. 116, 122 [147 N.E. 588] ; Com: monwealt1r. v. McKnight, 289 Mass. 530. 546-547 [195 N.E.
~ 499}; Com11U)nwealth v. McHugh, 316 Mass. 15, 22 [54 N.E.
2d 934]; Commonwealth v. Green, 326 Mass. 344, 348 [94
; N.E.2d 260J [see Pearce, supra, 101 U.of Pa.L.Rev. 967, 983·
987) ; State v. Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245, 254-261 [87 N.E.
ad 358J ; see, also, State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 244 [102
N.E.2d 233)),· and it has been changed by legislative en~ actment (Neb.Rev.Stat., ch. 28, § 28-1207 [Cum.Supp. 1947),
~ by drawing an analogy to the civil action for deceit (State v.
tNic1r.o18, 1 Del.Crim.Rep. (Houston) 114, 115; State v. MeI·Jlalum, m-pra, 49 R.I. 107, 108), and by construing a promise
'.. a representation of the "ability" or "intent" of the
promisor to perform (People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 333 [193
N.E. 150] ; Smith v. Fontana, 48 F.Supp. 55,59-60; Hameyer
/
••
State, 148 Neb. 798, 801 [29 N.W.2d 458J; T1r.e Queen v.
/
'Gordon (1889), L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 354, 359, 360; Rex v. Bancroft
(1909), 3 Cr.App.Cas. 16, 21; Rex v. Alexandra, 26 Crim.

t
t

r
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'The majoritJ rule was also rejected b7 the United States Supreme
fCourt in the construction of the federal mail fraud statute, 17 6tata.
183
. . ,323. See DurZcJtId Y. United Statu, 161 U.S. 306, 313 [16 tI.Ct.
1J08, 40 L.Ed. 709]. On the basis of the Durland case, the statute was
amended to include apeei1leall1 falBe promisee. 85 Stata. 1130, 18 U.S.o.
~U (1946). See Pearce ,.".., 101 U.ol Pa.L.B.v. H7, 878·8SU.
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App.R. 116 (1937); ct. Re:e v. Asferley, 7 Car.& P. 191. 173
Eng.Rep. 84 (1835».
In California, the precedents are conflicting. Early decisions of the District Courts of Appeal follow the general
rule as originally formulated by Wharton (People v. Green,
22 Cal.App. 45, 48 [133 P. 334]; People v. Kahler, 26 Cal.
App. 449, 452[147 P. 228) ; People v. Beese, 136 Cal.App.
657, 663-665 [29 P.2d 450] ; People v. Downing, 14 Cal.App.
2d 392,395 [58 P.2d 657]; People v. Jackson, 24 Cal.App.2d
182, 203-204 [74 P.2d 1085] ; People v. Daniels, 25 Cal.App.
2d 64, 72 [76 P.2d 556] ; see, also, People v. Walker, 76 Cal.
App. 192, 205 [244 P. 94]; but see People v. Morphy, 100
Cal. 84 [34 P. 623]), but more recently it has been held
(and the holdings were approved by this eourt in People v.
Jones, 36 Cal.2d 373, 377 [224 P.2d 353]) that a promise
made without intention to perform is a misrepresentation
of a state of mind, and thus a misrepresentation of existing
faet, and is a false pretense within the meaning of section
484 of the Penal Code. (Peop~ v. AmBl, 61. Cal.App.2d
522, 531-532 [143 P.2d 92]; People v. Gordon, 71 Cal.App.
2d 606, 624-625 [163 P.2d 110]; People v. Ohamberlain. 96
Ca1.App.2d 178, 182 [214 P.2d 600]; People v. Da'lJ'i8, 112
Cal;App.2d 286, 289, 298-300 [246 P.2d 160]; People v.
Frankfort, 114 Cal.App.2d 680, 698 [251 P.2d 401]; see, also,
Peop~ v. Bratfen, 137 Ca1.App. 658 [31 P.2d 210]: People
v. Mason, 86 Cal.App.2d 445, 449-450 [195 P.2d 60]; People v.
Staver, 115 Cal.App.2d 711, 716-720 [252 P.2d 700) ; People
v. Silva, 119 Cal.App.2d 863 [260 P.2d 251].) These decisions, like those following the majority rule, were made with
little explanation of the reasons for the rule. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has, however, advanced
the following reasons in defense of the majority rnle: "It is
of course true that then, [at the time of the early English
eases cited by Wharton, supra] as now, the intention to commit eertain erimes was aseertained by looking backward from
the act and finding that the aeeused intended to do what he
did do. However, where, 88 here, the act complained ofnamely, failure to repay money or use it 88 speeifted at the
time of borrowing-is 88 consonant with ordinary commercial
default as with criminal conduet, the danger of applying this
technique to prove the crime is quite apparent. Business
affairs would be materially eneumbered by the ever present
threat that the debtor might be subjeeted to criminal penalties
if tlae prosecutor and j'Dr'7 were of the view that at the time
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of borrowing he was mentally a cheat. The risk of prose.
cuting one who is guilty of nothing more than a failure to
pay his debts is a very rea) consideration. . • .
"If we were to accept the government's position the way
would be open for every victim of a bad bargain to resort
to crimina) proceedings to even the score with a judgment
proof adversary. No doubt in the development of our criminal
law the zeal with which the innocent are protected has provided a measure of shelter for the guilty. However, we
do not think it wise to increase the possibility of conviction
by broadening the accepted theory of the weight to be attached to the mental attitude of the accused." (Chaplin v.
United States, 157 F.2d 697. 698-699: but see the dissenting
opinion of Edgerton. J., at 699-701.) We do not find this
. reasoning persuasive. [11] In this state, and in the mao
jority of American states as well as in England, false promises
can provide the foundation of a civil action for deceit. (Civ.
Code, §§ 1572, subd. 4, 1710. subd. 4; see 125 A.L.R. 881.
882.) In such actions something more than nonperformance is
lequked to prove the defendant's intent not to perform his
promise. (Newman v. Smith, 77 Cal. 22,26 [18 P. 791] : Berkey
Y. Balm, 101 Cal.App.2d 62. 69 [224 P.2d 885], and cases there
oited; Rest. Torts, § 530. com. c.) [12] Nor is proof of
nonperformance alone sufficient in criminal prosecutions
based on false promises. (See, for example, People v. Gordon,
. Ivpt'a; People v. Chamberlam, supra; People v. Frank/MI,
ivpra; People v. Davis. supra; Rez v. Kritz (1949), 1 K.B.
) [13] In such prosecutions the People must, as in all
- -.•"'--"-_!prosecutions, prove their case beyond a reasonable
Any danger, through the instigation of criminal pro_~Il~ by disgruntled creditors, to those who have blame·
encountered "commercial defaults" must, therefore, be
pn:u.r\lA"'~U upon the idea that trial juries are incapable of
:l'"~ilglllllg the evidence and understanding the instruction that
must be convinced of the defendant's fraudulent intent
:lIe'rollld a reasonable doubt, or that appellate courts will be
JUI]~ll4n in discharging their duty to ascertain that there is
RlDlcl~ent evidence to support a conviction.
[14] The problem of proving intent when the false pre·
is a false promise is no more difficult than when the
pretense is a misrepresentation of existing fact, and
intent not to perform a promise is regularly proved in
actions for deceit. Specific intent is also an essential

264

PEOPLE v. AsHLEY

[42 C.2d

element of many crimes.· [115] Moreover, in cases of obtaining property by false pretenses, it must be proved that any
misrepresentations of fact alleged by the People were made
knowingly and with intent to deceive. If such misrepresentations are made innocently or inadvertently, they can no more
form the basis for a prosecution for obtaining property by
false pretenses than can an innocent breach of contract.
[18] Whether the pretense is a false promise or a misrepresentation of fact, the defendant'. intent must be proved in
both instances by something more than mere proof of nonperformance or actual falsity (ct. Uniled 81at" v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78 [64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148]), and the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed to that effect.
U [T]he accepted theory of the weight to be attached to the
mental attitude of the accused t, is, therefore, not "broadened," but remains substantially the same. (Of. C'1uJpZin 'V)
United 8tate., supra, 157 F.2d 697, 699.)
[1'1] It has been contended that the express provision
for obtaining property by false promises in section 182 of
the Penal Codel indicates that the Legislature did not regard
such promises as ,. false pretenses" within the meaning of
sections 484 and 532 of the Penal Code. In support of this
contention it is urged that if the obtaining of property by
false promises with fraudulent intent not to perform such
promises were regarded as a crime it was unnecessary to
provide for such a crime in subdivision 4 of section 182.
It is then concluded that since words of a statute cannot
be regarded as superfluous, if a reasonable construction
thereof will give etIect to them and preserve all other words
of the statute, the provision in section 182 for obtaining
property by false promises can be given effect only on the
theory that the Legislature did not regard the obtaining of
property by such promises as a crime and therefore as being
I

)

/

'For uample. arson. burgla17, lameD,.. maliciotil miIchief, and robbe17.
In proBeCutioDII for attempted crimes. or for auault with intent to com·
mit marder, robbe17. rape, etc., the .pecitlc intent mutt alIo be proved.
'Section 182: "U two or more persona conspire: 1. To commit an,.
crime; 2. Falsel,. and maliciousl,. to indict another for aD1 crime.· or to
procure auother to be charged or arrested for an,. crime; 8. Falsel1 to
move or maintain any 8uit, action or proceeding: 4. To cheat or defraud
an1 person of any propert1, b,. any mean. which are ill themselves
criminal, or to obtain money or property b,. false pretel1lle. or by false
promises with fraudulent intent not to perform nch promise.; 5. To
commit an1 act illjurie1l8 to the public health. to public morals. or to
pervert or obstruct jUlItice. or the due administration of the laws. The1
are punishable as followl: • • ."
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covered by subdivision 1. This argument proves too much.
Subdivisions 2 and 3 provide for conspiracies to commit acts
that would amount to perjury or subornation of perjury.
Subdivision 4 provides for conspiracies to cheat or defraud
any person of his property "by any means which are in
~ themselves criminal," and to obtain property by false pretenses, a crime defined in sections 484 and 532 of the Penal
Code. Subdivision 5 likewise includes acts that are criminal.
Sint'e these provisions describe many acts that are undoubtedly crimes, and thus included in the broad language of
, subdivision 1, they were probably added by the Legislature
I: out of an abundance of caution to insure the carrying out
1, of its purpose to include all such acts within the scope of
J',
the section. The same abundance of caution is evidenced
in subdivision 4 by the inclusion of both "false pretenses"
and .. false promises" even though the former includes the
latter. The omission of a comma after "false pretenses"
also indicates that the Legislature did not set the one off
from the other as a separate class of crime but regarded
them as the same kind of crime.
If false promises were not false pretenses, the legally
~. sophisticated, without fear of punishment, could perpetrate
on the unwary fraudulent schemes like that divulged by
t the record in this case and those described in People v. Davis,
supra, Peop16 Y. Gordon, supra, People v. Frankfort, supra,
. and Peop16 Y. Chamberlain, supra. To hold that false promises are not false pretenses would sanction such schemes without any corresponding benefit to the public order. [18] The
inclusion of false promises within sections 484 and 532 of
the Penal Code will not "materially encumber" business
affairs:' [19] "Ordinary commercial defaults" will not be the
subject of criminal prosecution, for the essence of the offense
of obtaining property by false pretenses is (as it has always
. been) the fraudulent intent of the defendant. This intent
, must be proved by the prosecution; a showing of nonper. formance of a promise or falsity of a representation will
not suffice.

I.

/

•All shown above, to obtain property by false promises haa been an
mdictable offense in a number of states for many years. Our attention
hal not been directed to a judgment of conviction in any of those states
that u based on a transaction remotely resem bUng an "ordinary com·
mercial default."
One 8cholar reports that inquiries directed to the
Better Business Bureaus in the lE'ading cities of those states reccived
..tireb' negative answers. The busine&s community does not seem to be
. aware of an "ever present threat" of criminal prosecutions for breaeh
el eoa&rac&. See Pearce, .upT4, 101 U.o1 Pa.L.Rev. 967, 1007. .
\
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In contending that the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses, defendant argues that the testimony of Mrs. Russ and Mrs.
Neal was not only contradicted, but was inconsistent and
self-contradictory, and thus incapable of belief. [20] It
was for the jury to sift the true from the false, to determine
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
the testimony of an individual witness, even if it was inconsistent. (People v. White, 115 Cal.App.2d 828, 831 [253
P.2d 108]; People v. Frankfor" 114 Cal.App.2d 680. 700
[251 P.2d 401] ;PeopZe v. Moulton, 71 Cal.App.2d 195. 197
[162 P.2d 317].) [21] Defendant points to Mrs. Russ'
testimony that defendant told her that "they" owned the
La Brea property and to her later testimony that the loan
was made directly to defendant. that the corporation "was
not brought into this at all," and that she relied on his,
representation of ownership of the La Brea property. Mrs.
Russ was 71 years of age at the time of trial. It is possible
that the pronouns were interchanged owing to knowledge later
acquired, a slip of the tongue, or to the fact that defendant
and the corporation he represented had become one in her
mind. These matters were for the jury to consider in deter.
mining the weight to be given the testimony; they do not,
as is contended, destroy the testimony. [22] The same holds
true with respect to Mrs. Russ' refusal to admit her sig.
nature to the letter acknowledging receipt of the note and
trust deed from the corporation. It is apparent that this
letter. typewritten on the stationery of Life's Estate, was
not written by her. and that she refused to acknowledge the
letter or her signature because the letter stated that she
had received a note prior to the one whose receipt was
acknowledged in the letter. After trial. a note dated Jan·
uary 5, 1949, was produced, which is presumably the one
to which reference was made. Even if there was such a
note, it does not follow that Mrs. Russ received it or that
she realized what the contents of the letter were when she
signed it. Even if she received the note and returned it
as indicated in the letter, and thereafter forgot or concealed
this fact, the matter is not material to the main issue and
goes merely to credibility.
[23] In the case of Mrs. Neal, defendant contends that
the gun episode completely negates reliance on therepresentations, and that her testimony was so contradictory as to
be iDherentq improbable. Mrs. Neal teitifled that abe had

I:::,,1:: len:!=::~::;:.
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the bonds not redeemable at a bank. This testimony reflects
a strong inability to make up her mind. Mn. Neal took all
her bonds to the bank in the first instance; thereafter she'
allowed the proceeds of the bonds not then cashed to be sent
to her at the La Brea address; and finally she endorsed the
cheek but did not take possession of it. The jury could
reasonably conclude that she intended to make a loan of the
money represented by the check at that time, in reliance
upon the representations previously made. Thereafter, the
gun episode occurred. It accomplished no more than an
exchange of promissory notes, giving iln outward appearance
of regularity to the transaction. Defendant's contention
that if any crime were proved in connection with his trans.
actions with Mrs. Neal, it was extortion and not theft, must
.. 'therefore be rejected. Defendant did not forcibly take Mrs.
Neal's money in the gun episode. He had already acquired
'it, and the crime of theft had already been committed.
[94] The evidence justified the implied finding that the
money had been acquired with felonious intent. The jury
. 'could reasonably conclude that defendant was the true head
of this organization, and had deliberately set out to acquire
the life savings of his victims. one a woman nearing 70 and
the other a woman of little education and rural background,
and both with little or no. business experience. The women
.. were won over by flattering offers of positions in the organic 'zation and false promises of security for their loans, and
" . thereafter held in line by importunate and then menacing
supplications. The lure of an ambitious theater project was
,. cheld before the eyes of each. a project that was never realized.
: ; The evidence was sufficient to sustain the implied finding
~ ,that defendant never intended to acquire or build such a
',theater, and, indeed, the financial situation revealed by the
(( evidence made the acquisition or building of such a theater
! illusory.
The money acquired was needed and used for the
running expenses of the corporation within a short time of
its receipt.
;~ '. [25] Defendant also contends that the necessary proof
. e of "corroborating circumstances" is lacking.
It is the duty
of the reviewing court to examine the evidence to determine
t'whether the corroboration required by the statute has been
fproved; the weight to be given such evidence is for the jury.
'i-~.. [26] The testimony of Mrs. Russ was fully corroborated.
The witness Farnsworth testified that defendant had told him
<
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that the Sunset property belonged to defendant, and that
Farnsworth had been sent to an architect for plans of a
theater to be built thereon. It was also shown that Mrs.
Russ was given a second trust deed on the Nichols Canyon
property. Mrs. Russ testified that she had been promised
a first mortgage on the La Brea property; the defense maintained throughout that the loan was to be unsecured. The
giving of the trust deed was indicative of a prior promise to
give security. The testimony of various witnesses and the
opening of the escrow clearly corroborate Mrs. Neal's testimony about defendant's promises to buy the EI Patio Theater.
[27] In addition, the fact that a defendant bas made
the same or a similar representation to another. although at
a different time and place, is a corroborating circumstance.
(People v. Jones, 36 Ca1.2d 373, 379 [224 P.2d 353] ; People
v. Chait, 69 Cal.App.2d 503. 516 [159 P.2d 445] : People '(a
McCabe, 60 Cal.App.2d 492, 497 (141 P.2d 54]; People v.
La France, 28 Cal.App.2d 152, 156 [82 P.2d 465] ; People v.
Fisher, 116 Cal.App. 243, 246 [2 P.2d 564] : People v. Whiteside, 58 Cal.App. 33, 41 [208 P. 1321.) In the present
case, essentially similar representations were made to each
of the women. There is not only the similarity in express
l'epresentations, but in basic approach. offers of employment,
and repeated supplications. They may therefore corroborate
each other. (People v. •Jones, supra.)
The attorney general contends that additional corroboration may be found in the fact that defendant did not call
Mrs. Wingrave, the president of the corporation, as a witness.
.AB the record does not disclose that Mrs. Wingrave had any
knowledge that would have thrown light on whether the
representations had or had not been made, the failure to
call her as a witness can have no bearing on this issue.
It is also contended that defendant's failure to testify is
corroborative. [28] A defendant's failure to take the stand
"to deny or explain evidence presented against him, when
it is in his power to do so, may be considered by the jury
as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence. and as
indicating that among the inferences that may reasonably
be drawn therefrom, those unfavorable to the defendant are
the more probable." (People v. Adamson, 27 Ca1.2d 478,
489 [165 P.2d 3].) [29] But the failure to testify will
not supply a lacuna in the prosecution's proof. (People v.
ZofJcl, 35 Cal.App.2d 215. 221 (95 P.2d 1601: People V.
Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 489-490 [165 P.2d 3]; Peo])"" v.
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Sawaya, 46 Cal.App.2d 466, 471 [115 P.2d 1001]; People Y.
Cox, 102 Cal.App.2d 285, 287 [227 P.2d 290].) The rule
is analogous to that in civil cases where the failure to produce
evidence on the part of the defendant may not be considered
until 8 prima facie case has been made by the plaintiir.
(Girvet. v. Boy's Market, Inc., 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 830 [208
P.2d 6] ; Breland v. Traylor Eng. " Mfg. Co., 52 Cal.App.2d
415,425-426 [126 P.2d 455].) [30] In criminal cases, after
the prosecution has made a prima facie case, the failure of
the defendant to testify is not affirmative evidence of any
fact, and any inference that can, in the circumstance, be
justly drawn therefrom is persuasive rather thllD probative,
lending weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution.
In the present case the corroborative evidence adduced by
the State was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury.
which could then consider defendant's failure to deny or
explain that evidence in determining the weight it was to be
given.
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair hearing on
his motion for a new trial and that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to grant a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence.
[31] Despite the fact that 8 daily transcript of the trial
was available, three continuances of the hearing on the motion
for new trial were granted at the request of defendant's
counsel. The hearing was then set for July 20th upon the
definite understanding that the motion was to be heard and
decided then. On that day counsel argued the motion at
length and announced that other parts of the motion were
in the process of preparation by defendant who needed time
to secure signatures to affidavits No details as to the contents of the affidavits were furnished, nor did defendant's
counsel state that defendant wished to argue. CoUDJI:>l indicated that he would not argue the remaining part of the
motion. A continuance was granted upon the condition that
there would be no further oral argument. Neither the State
nor the defense objected to this ruling. It was not until
leveral more continuances had been granted. owing to the
late filing of affidavits and the need to prepare counteraffidavits, that the motion was submitted and decided. It was
within the discretion of the trial court to refuse any continuance on July 20th. (People v. Winthrop, 118 Cal. 85, 92
[50~. 390]; People v. Mayes, 78 Cal.App.2d 282, 291-292
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[177 P.2d 590].) The granting of a continuance upon the
conditions and under the circumstances indicated, was proper.
When defendant's affidavit· was filed, the trial judge commented upon the fact that documents were set forth three
and four times therein, that it contained irrelevant statements,
and that it was repetitious and argu1llentative. He commented
that such an unnecessarily long (78 pages) affidavit tried
not only the patience of the trial court, but that if it should
go before an appellate court, "it would try their patience
to the extent that it well deserves that saying of seeing how
far it willlly up the stairs when you throw it."
Defendant contends that the attitude of the trial court, as
reflected by the denial of additiona] oral argument and its
remarks, denied a fair and impartial hearing on the motion
for new trial. [32] If the trial court misconceives or refuses to do its duty with reference to a motion for anew'
trial and denies reasonable opportunity for oral argument,
a new trial must be granted. (People v. Sarazzawski, 27
Ca1.2d 7, 15, 17-18 [161 P.2d 934].) The record shows, however, that despite his remarks, the trial judge carefully
read and considered the affidavits presented and caUed for
the originals of the documents mentioned therein. The affidavits filed by defendant were in effect the oral argument
presented in written form. It is clear that a fair and impartial hearing on the motion was had.
[33] The newly discovered evidence consisted of documents allegecJly withheld and suppressed by the district attorney and of affidavits relating to testimony that would show
that Mrs. Neal had committed perjury. The documents were
aUegedly among the files of the corporation seized by the
district attorney and not returned until such time that they
could not be found and presented during the trial. This
charge is a serious one. If true, it tends to show a deliberate
attempt to convict on perjured testimony with full knowledge
of its falsity. The facts, however, refute the charge.
An affidavit of a Miss Bartholomew, and an affidavit of
defendant, averred that full access to the files of Life fS Estate
had not been given; that Mr. McClure, an investigator in
the district attorney's office. had refused full access to the
illes. The truth of the averments therein was denied by
eounteraffidavits of the assistant district attorney and of Mr.
McClure. An unverified affidavit of Miss Bartholomew told
of threats to her made by the assistant district attorney
relatinl to her foregoing affidavit.
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There was more, however, than the mere denial of the
charges and the implications therein. The only document
that was material and that would almost certainly have produced a different result had it been authentic was one that
purported to be the receipt that Mrs Russ testified had been
given her by defendant and later returned to him. This
document. which bears the signature of Mrs. Russ. is singularly complete; it states that an agreement had been reached
between Mrs. Russ and the board of directors of Life's Estate.
that the loan was to be unsecured. that the loan was to be
used for "the purpose of paying on bills and other general
expenses of Life's Estate, Ltd .• and or at it's sole option,
for maintaining and or improving the leased property at
1537 N. La Brea. which is leased from a Dr. Phillips, and or
the property owned by the corporation at 7051 Sunset Boulevard, upon which an office and ballroom are now being constructed," and that Mrs. Russ was making the loan strictly
upon her own investigation and reliance on the future possibilities of the business. The document contradicts every
incriminating item of Mrs. Russ' testimony. Mr. Clark
Sellers, a handwriting expert, testified that the signature was
that of Mrs. Russ and that in his opinion it was a carbon
impression of an original signature in pencil. In an affidavit,
Mrs. Russ averred that she had never seen the document.
that she had signed for a package of chocolates sent by a
person who did not enclose a card or make himself known.
The manager of the apartment house in which Mrs. Russ
lived stated in an affidavit that a messenger had come to
deliver the package, but refused to accept the manager's
signature for it. It thus appears that the document had
not been in the tiles held by the district attorney, but was
manufactured, and that the signature thereon was procured
by stratagem. Another such document, purporting to be the
agreement of Mrs. Neal to the cancellation of the escrow and
mentioning that her loan was unsecured, was ftled with the
appellate court almost a year after the ftles had been returned.
That part of the document where Mrs. Neal's signature might
have been, was torn off. The other matter presented as newly
discovered evidence was cumulative, denied by counterafH.
davits, and came from unreliable sources. The court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
Mrs. Neal's testimony at the preliminary hearing was read
at the trial Mrs. Neal was in North Carolina at the time
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of trial, and was unable to come to this state. Section 686
of the Penal Code provides that a defendant has the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him in the presence of the court but that the deposition of a witness may
be read if he is dead, insane, or cannot be found within the
state, and if the charge has been examined before a commit;.
ting magistrate and the testimony taken down by question
and answer in the presence of the defendant who has himself
or through counsel cross-examined or had the opportunity to
cross-examine.
At the preliminary hearing, a cashier's check for $13,590
payable to Mrs. Neal and endorsed by her was introduced
in evidence. along with a bank deposit slip of the same date
showing a deposit of the same amount to the account of Life's
Estate. Mrs. Neal testified that she had endorsed. this check
to defendant and had given it to him. At the trial, the
People introduced a second cashier'. check of the same date
and amount, payable to Life'. Estate and endorsed for deposit
by defendant. It appears that Mrs. Neal endorsed the first
cashier'. check back to the bank which then issued the second
cashier's check payable to Life's Estate. Defendant contends
that he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine Mrs.
Neal about the validity of her signature on the second cashier'.
cheek and to impeach her testimony at the preliminary hear.
ing. This contention is without merit. [34] The right of
confrontation can be waived (People v. WaZlin, 34 Cal.2d 777,
'l81 [215 P.2d 1]), and defendant did not object to the introduction of the second cashier's cheek. Furthermore, the
error in Mrs. Neal's testimony about the first cashier's check
is apparent on the face of the second check. The issue was
thus presented to the jury, and the trial court did not err
in admitting the second cashier's check in eVidence.
Defendant contends that the reading of Mrs. Neal'a testimony at the trial deprived him of the right of eonfrontation
in violation of the United States Constitution. Even if this
right is guaranteed under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
as contended by defendant (see Snyder v. Mas8tJChuseti8, 291
U.S. 97, 106 [54 S.Ct. 830, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575]),
there is no merit in the contention. [35] "The substance
of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner
in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness faceto-face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examinatiou." (Jlatloll: 1'. United 81al", 156 U.S. 237, 244 [15

.I

Feb. 1954J

PEOPLE t1. ASHLEY
(U C.2d 246; 267 P.2d 2711

273

S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409J.) Defendant had that advantage
at the preliminary hearing.
Although a count of criminal conspiracy was also in·
volved at the preliminary hearing, that fact does not in·
k -nilidate Mrs. Neal's testimony. Counsel examined the tran.
acript and eliminated testimony that was inadmissible at the
trial. The admissibility of controverted parts of the testimony
~ was passed upon by the trial court before it was read to
I the jury.
~:
The claim of error is predicated upon the denial of a
motion to have the prosecution elect between the two counts
charging defendant with grand theft from Mrs. Neal, and
, between the two counts charging him with grand theft from
, Mrs. Russ. It is contended that only one theft was com, mitted as to each of the prosecuting witnesses. [36] "Where
" the proof in a given case is sufficient to show Cle existence
, Of a fraudulent intent or purpose on the part of an accused
" to obtain property from another by false or fraudulent repre·
" aentations, the making of the first false representations which
; moved or induced the person to whom they were made to
• part with his property does not immune the defrauding per" son from punishment for subsequently obtaining from said
, Person other property which was parted with under the in·
: tluence of the fraudulent representations which were still
'operating on the mind of the defrauded person at the time
"he passed his property into the hands of said designing per'eon!' (People v. Babe, 202 Cal. 409, 413 [261 P. 303].)
This rule has been consistently followed in this state. (People
v. Scott, 112 Ca1.App.2d 350. 351 [246 P.2d 122] ; People v.
Howel, 99 Cal.App.2d 808. 818 [222 P.2d 969J; People v.
,Mile" 37 Cal.App.2d 373, 378-379 [99 P.2d 551] ; People v.
EllisOfl, 26 Cal.App.2d 496. 498-499 [79 P.2d 732].)
,[37] Defendant contends that he could not be charged
With a prior felony conviction. He admitted conviction of
eonspiracy, a felony, and the serving of a term therefor in
;a. federal penitentiary. For the first time on appeal, it is
iftvealed that the crime was a conspiracy to use the mails to
I defraud, and it is contended that such a conviction is not
ra prior conviction within our statutes. It is. (Pen. Code,
f §§ 969b, 3024, 8ubd. (c).) The fact that the minimum term of
flelltenee is thereby increased does not render the law unconsti~~-;tu,"tiODal. (People v. Dutton, 9 Ca1.2d 505, 507 [71 P.2d 218];
People v. Dunlop, 102 Cal.App.2d 314. 316·317 [227 P.2d
~l] ; 25 Am.Jur., Habitual Criminals, §§ 3-8.)
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Defendant contends that the trial judge deprived him of a
fair trial by limiting cross-examination, acting as prosecutor,
slyly hinting to the prosecutor how to lead a witness. We
find no basis in the record for these conclusions. [38] ., It
is not only the right but the duty of a trial judge to so
supervise and regulate the course of a trial that the truth
shall be revealed so far as it may be, within th~ established
rules of evidence" (People v Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 46 [223
P. 65): People v. Martmez. 38 Ca1.2d 556, 564 [241 P.2d
2241. ) That duty was performed and the trial judge so
conducted the trial as to fully safeguard defendant's rights.
[39] Finally. defendant contends that the district attorney was guilty of misconduct in bis argument to the jury,
particularly when he said that Mrs Russ was "robbed" of
the security of ber second trust deed at a later time. The
jury was aware that no charge to that effect was' involved,
and that the word was used in the ~olloquia1 rather than the
legal sense. The jury was properly cautioned.
The purported appeals from the verdicts are dismissed as
nonappealable. The judgment and the order denying the
motion for a new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
SCRA UER. J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in
the judgment solely on the ground that the evidence establishes, with ample corroboration. the making by the defendant
of false representations as to existing facts. On that evidence
the convictions should be sustained pursuant to long accepted
theories of law.
It is unnecessary on the record to make of this rather simple
case a vehicle for the revolutionary holding, contrary to the
weight of authority in this state and elsewhere, that a promise
to payor perform at a future date. if unfultilled, can become
the basis for a criminal prosecution on the theory that it
was a promise made without a present intention to perform
it and that. therefore. whatever of value was received for
the promise was property procured by a false representation.
Accordingly. 1 dissent from an that portion of the opinion
which discusses and pronounces upon the theories which in
my view are extraneous to the proper disposition of any issue
actually before us.
The majority opinion strikes down a rule of law, relating
to the character and competence of proof of crime, which
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has been almost universally respectedfoT 200 years-and
the reasoning which has been advanced fOT the innovation
is that creditors, grand jurors, and prosecutors must not
be f'xpected to institute any criminal charges against innocent people. and that even if they do the intelligence of
trial jurors and the wisdom of appellate judges can be
depended upon to right the wrong, hence the time honored
rule may bE.' scrapped. The unreality of this Teasoning and
the wisdom of the old rule become obvious on reflection.
In a prosecution for obtaining property by the making of
a false promise. knowingly and with intent to deceive, the
matter to be proved, as to its criminality, is purely subjective. It is not, like the specific intent in such a crime as
burglary, a mere element of the crime; it is, in any significant
sense, all of the crime. The proof will necessarily be of
objective acts, entirely legal in themselves, from which inferences as to the ultimate illegal subjective fact will be
drawn. But, whereas in burglary the proof of the subjective
element is normally as strong and reliable as the proof of
any objective element, in this type of activity the proof of
such vital element can almost never be l'eliable: it must inevitably (in the absence of confession 01' something tantamount th('reto) depend on inferences drawn by creditors,
prosecutors, jurors. and judges from facts and circumstances
which by reason of their nature cannot possibly exclude
innocence with any certainty, and which can point to guilt
only when construed and interpreted by the creditol', prosecutor or trier of fact adversely to the person charged. Such
inferences as proof of the alleged crime have long been recog~
nized as so unreliable that they have been excluqed from the
~
category of acceptable proof.
j"
•
As a basis for overturning the rule that proof of the mere
~:: making of a promise to perform in the future and of sub~ sequent failure to perform is not proof of a false pretense,
~ the majority opinion first purportedly adheres to the rule
by stating that "proof of nonperformance alone [is not]
t sufticient in criminal prosecutions based on false promises,"
i then argues that" Any danger. through the instigation of
[ criminal proceedings by disgruntled creditors, to those who
have blamelessly ~ncountered 'coI?mercial de~aul.ts' .. must,
.'. therefore,be predlcated upon the Idea that tnal lUl'les are
. incapable of weighing the evidence and understanding the
.'. instruction that they must be convinced of the defendant's
.' fraudulent intent beyond a reasonable doubt, or that appel·
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late courts will be derelict in discharging their duty to ascertain that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction."
This doctrine. if universally applied. would eliminate all rules
governing the quality and sufficiency of proof. The credence
to be placed in the testimony of accomplices. or other complaining witnesses. would be left entirely to the sagacity of
jurors and the presumed omniscience of appellate judges.
I am unwilling to accept as a premise the scholastic redaction
of the majority that rules of proof may be set aside because
appellate judges will always know when a jury has been
misled and the proof is not sufficient. The most important
function which courts have to perform in respect to criminal
law is not to make easier the conviction of alleged miscreant§;
it is the protection of the innocent against false conviction.
The highest duty which this court has to perform in thE"
cause of justice is to protect the individual person against
the power of the state; the most grievous injury it can do
to the people is to assist m building a superstate by countenancing encroachments on the rights of individuals and
whittling away at the rules which protect them.
The suggestion in the majority opinion that it is inconceivable "that trial juries are incapable of weighing the
evidence [impliedly, with omniscient accuracy however inconclusive it be] and understanding the instruction that they
must be convinced of the defendant's fraudulent intent beyond a reasonable doubt, or that appellate courts will be
derelict [less than omniscient] in discharging their duty"
a1fords no substantial basis for striking down a rule of proof.
. misrepresentations
The opinion naively continues: "If
are made innocently or inadvertently, they can no more form
the basis for a prosecution for obtaining property by false
pretenses than can an innocent breach of contract" I
The tragic part of the above quoted philosophy is that
the very declaration of it as a rule of law makes it false in
fact. It becomes false in fact because when published as a
rule of law it cuts the heart out of a pertinent safeguard
which the accumulated wisdom of at least two centuries has
found to be necessary to prevent the conviction of the innocent
who have met with commercial misfortune.
With the rule that the majority opinion now enunciates,
no man, no matter how innocent his intention. can sign a
promise to pay in the future, or to perform an act at a
future date, without subjecting himself to the risk that at
some later date others, in the light of differing perspectives,
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philosophies and subsequent events, may conclude that. after
all, the accused should have known that at the future date
he could not perform as he promised and if he-as a "reason·
able" man from the point of view of the creditor. district
attorney !VQ a grand or trial jury-should have known, then,
it may be inferred, he did know. And if it can be inferred
that he knew, then this court and other appellate courts will
be bound to affirm a conviction.
A trial by jury, under circumstances easily to be foreseen,
would offer but hazardous protection in such a case. I have
faith-great faith-in our jury system as now constituted.
But I have developed that faith through seeing it operate
under wise and time-tested regulations and limitations as
to the essential characteristics of proof which do not unrealistically assume that any human-whether a district attorney
or a grand juror or a trial juror or a judge or justice of a
court-is beyond error.
The far reaching and revolutionary ruling of the majority
opinion made under the circumstances shown, indicates to
me not so much a desire to enforce law as a fervor to declare
new law; the criticized ruling is not necessary to an affirmance
in this case. Defendant here did more than merely make
a promise, with or without a present intention to perform,
to pay his victims in the future and fail to perform that
promise. There is evidence from which it could be found
that Mrs. Russ was induced to deliver property to defendant
through reliance in a material degree on his knowingly false
representations that he owned the La Brea property, on which
he would give her a first mortgage. 1 whereas the property
'Defendant was accused in two separate counts of feloniously taking
.3,000 in money from Mrs. Russ on or about November 19. 1948, and of
felouiously taking .4,200 in money from ber on or about December 4.
1948.
The People's evidence as to these counts sbows the fOllowing: On
November 18, 1948, defendant told Mrs. Russ that be owned the Sunset
and the La Brea property, asked ber if she had any cash, and when she
replied that sbe had .3,000 stated that he would give her a first mortgage
on the La Brea property if she would lend him the money. Later on
the 18th defendant asked Mrs. Russ if she had any real or personal
property and she told him that she had a first trust deed and a ehattel
-mortgage.
On November 19 defendant drove Mrs. Russ to the bank and. induced
11)' and in reliance on the misrepresentations, she delivered .3,000 iD
easb to him.
Defendant thereafter repeated his misrepresentations as to the La Bl'ea
property and his inquiries as to whether Mrs. Rusl owned any other
property, and stated that in exchange for the first trust deed she could
laave • first mortaaae on the La Brea propert7. Either" four or llve
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was in fact owned by Dr. Phillips, who had leased it to an
officer and stockholder of Life's Estate and had not authorized its encumbrance. There is evidence from which it could
be found that a material element in the inducement of Mrs.
Neal to deliver property to defendant was his knowingly
false representation that she would have good security for
her loan because Life's Estate was worth half a million dollars,2 whereas it was in fact in financial difficulty. These false
representations as to existing matters of fact would support
the conviction. It has been consistently beld in this state
that even though there is but one misrepresentation, there
are separate offenses of theft through false pretenses if property is obtained on separate occasions, because the crime is,
not eomplete until defendant obtains possession of the property.·
days" after the cash transaction, or on November 20, defendant again
drove Mrs. Russ to the bank and she obtained and turned over to him
the trnst deed and chattel mortgage. Defendant told her he would
•• cash" these evidences of indebtedness.
Shortly thereafter Mrs. Rusa sold her trailer for $1,580 and turned
thia sum over to defendant, again in reliance on hill representations as
to the La Brea property.
Abou~ January 15. 1949, defendant sold the trust deed to a broker
for $3.000.
"Dcfendant was a('cused in two separate counte of feloniously taking
from Mrs. Neal $13,590 on or about June 19. 1948, and $4,470 on or
about Augupt 3. 1948.
The People's evidence as to these counts shows the following: In
March, 1948. defendant met Mrs. Neal and asked her whether she had any
property. She told him that she had $17,500 in .. war bonds." He
learned by further questioning that the bonds were in North Carolina.
discussed with her the making of a loan. and induced her to have the
bonds sent to her.
After Mrs. Neal obtained possession ot the bonds she inquired as to
security and defendant replied that thO! security would be •• good," that
Life'. Estate was worth half a million dollars, that there was $125,000
worth of equipment in the La Brea building alone, and •• a lot of other
property." On June 19, 1948, the day after defendant made the last
mentioned representations, he drove Mrs. Neal to a bank where she
cashed $13,590 of the bonds and endorsed and delivered to defendant
the check for that amount which she received from the bank.
At defendant's instrnctions the remaining bonds. which could not be
cashed directly by a bank, were mailed for cashing with directions that
the cheek therefor be mailed to defendant. Defendant thereafter received
a check dated August 2, payable to Mrs. Neal for $4,470. She endorsed
this check OD August 3 and defendant cashed it OD August 4.
"The situation here ill substantially similar to that in People ". Babe
(1927), 202 Cal. 409, 417 r261 P. 303T, relied OD by the majority.
There defendant was charged in three counts with obtaining from one
person by false pretenses $1.250 on August 2. '4,000 on August 5, and a
deed to real property of the valu'! ot '11.000 on August 15. Each sum
was in payment for stock in a corporation whieh rlefl'nnant said would be.
but which was Dot, theroafter ineorporated. The false representations
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Evidence Constituting Corroboration
The requirement of section 1110 of the Penal Code that
the false pretenses, if proved by the testimony of only one
witness, be corrobol'atcd is met by evidence of similar pre·
tenses made to another. (People v. Whiteside (1922), 58 Cal.
App. 33,41 [208 P. 132] ; People v. Munson (1931), 115 Cal.
App. 694, 697 [2 P.2d 227); People v. McCabe (1943), 60
Cal.App.2d 492,497 {141 P.2d 54].}
Here the representations of existing facts made to each
of the victims, Mrs. Russ and Mrs. Neal, were similar; they
were misrepresentations as to the existing ownership of property by defendant or Life's Estate which would constitute
security for any loan they might make. The similarity of
defendant's scheme in each case is shown also by the representations as to the use to which any loan would be put. Even
though the representations as to things to be done in the
future are not suflicient in themselves to support a conviction,
they constitute a part of the fraudulent scheme and their
similarities furnish additional corroboration. The employe
of the bank who arranged for the cashing of Mrs. Neal's
bonds testified that when defendant and Mrs. Neal came to
the bank they stated that the proceeds of the bonds were to

/
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were that certain assets had been acquired for and certain persona had
agreed to act as omcera of the proposed company. Defendant contended
that one crime had been split into three parts. It was beld, .. (p. n31
Where the proof in a !riven ease is suJJicient to ahow the existence of •
fraudulent intent or purpose on the part of an accused to obtain propert,.
from another by false or fraudulent representationa, the making of the
Arat false representations whieb moved or induced the person to whom
they were made to part with his propert7 does not immune the defrauding
person from punishment for subsequently obtaining from said person
other propert,. whieb was parted with under the intluence of the fraudulent representations whieb were still operating upon the mind ot the
defrauded peraon at the time he passed his prope1't7 into the banda ot
&aid designing person.••• [p. '14] rT]he erime is accomplished when
u. accnaed receives into his possession propert,. which he bad planned to
fraudulentl,. pin. 80 ill the instant ease, while a general intent to defraud may have been formed ill the mind of the accused at the time of
or before he eompleted the firat offense. the other crimes charged 'lVere
completed as separate and distinct offenses on the da,.. that he unlawfully
took p088easion of the prope1't7 described in the several counts of the
indictment. ' ,
The theo1'7 ill false pretenses cases 18 somewhat similar to that ill em·
beulement eases where each act of fraudulent appropriation of a portion
of prope1't7 with whieb defendant is entrusted is a separate crime
(Peop" v. BtGfttord (1940). 16 CaI.2d 247, 251 [105 P.2d 969]) rather
than that ill larceny cases where the taking of prope1't7 on different
occasiona and even from difrerent owners pursuant toa general plan is
treated as a liIlrle offenae (PeopZtl.,. DilZOfl (1934),1 Cal.A.pp.2d 224, 229
[a8 P.2d 418]).

)
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be used in a real estate transaction involving a theatre. Also
one Farnsworth, an employe of Life's Estate who was not a
victim, testified that defendant told him that defendant o-wned
the Sunset property.
Generally corroborative is the following evidence: Farnsworth testified that after Mrs. Russ had delivered her property
to defendant she asked him for repayment at a time sooner
than defendant was willing to agree to; that defendant_ as
well as Mrs. Russ, appeared to be excited: and that defendant
said, "it will ruin me, and how am I going to raise the
money." An investigator for the district attorney testified
that he went to defendant's home and the offices of Life's
Estate on April 17, 1950, and told defendant's wife and
officers and employes of Life's Estate that he had a warrant
for defendant's arrest; that on this occasion and on two
other occasions when the investigator returned they did not
disclose defendant's whereabouts; that after defendant was
finally apprehended in Long Beach in August, 1950, he said
that he had gone east in an attempt to raise funds, that he
had known for some time that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued, and that he had not yet surrendered because he
wished to straighten out his affairs. Mrs. Shepard, a woman
not shown to be a victim, testified that on April 15, 1950.
she had a telephone conversation in which defendant told
her that he was going out of the city for a few days to raise
some money, that he would arrange that her money be returned, and that "I can't talk any longer . . • I am being
watched."
The testimonies of Mrs. Russ and Mrs. Neal as to the circumstances under which. they turned over their properties
to defendant and as to subsequent circumstances are in some
respects confused. but the jury may well have concluded that
this confusion, rather than casting doubt on the essential
portions of ~heir testimonies as to the false representations.
indicated an aspect of their characters which made defendant
select them as victims.
On the subject of the nature of the representation n~ces
sary to constitute the crime (whether a "false promise" is
a misrepresentation of past or existing fact), the jury were
instructed as follows:
"To constitute the crime of theft by obtaining money by
false pretense, the false pretense used must be a fraudulent
representation of an existing or past fact •••
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"A mere expression of opinion or a statement concerning
the future is not such a fraudulent representation ...
"You are instructed that if you find that the statements
made by the defendant were true when made, that a subsequent change in conditions, which made it impossible to
carry out the statements as made would not make them a false
representation . . .
" [A] promise is the expression of the present intent and
is a fact. Therefore if a promise is unconditionally made
and is made without intention of performance, it is a fraud.
The secret intention of a contracting party not to perform a
promised act which induces contractees to execute their agreement is an essential feature of his representation. Whether a
promise made to effect a transaction by subverting the will
and judgment of a promisee, was dishonest, is a matter for
the jury to determine from all of the evidence in the case."
The last quoted instruction is in accord with certain dicta
in People v. Gordon (1945), 71 Cal.App.2d 606, 624 [163
P.2d 110] [actually the false pretense upon which the con·
viction depended was not a mere promise; it was a misrepresentation as to the character and value of land and the stage
of its development for oil production 4 ], and People v. Mason
(1948), 86 Cal.App.2d 445. 449 [195 P.2d 60) [here, likewise,
the false pretense depended not on a mere promise; it was a
misrepresentation as to existing facts pertinent to the value
of oil stock, the drming project of the company, its financial
status, and the purpose of the defendant in letting the victim
•• get in because she was a friend of Enders"]. cited by this
court in People v. Jones (1950), 36 Ca1.2d 373. 377 f224
P.2d 353], for the proposition (also interjected by way of
dictum and entirely unnecessary to the decision) that •• a
promise, if unconditional and made without present intention
of performance, will cO!lstitute actionable fraud." In the
J ODt~S case the actual misrepresentations are stated by the
court as follows: "It appears from the testimony ... that
"The true ground ot the holding of the District Court of Appeal and
the peculiar sense in which it nsed the word "promises" is evident
from the following expression (p. 624 ot 71 Cal.App.2d).: I I The' assur·
ances' and 'guarnntees' of immediate profitable sales or leases tor the
vendees were of the nature of promises. tf a promise is unconditional
and is made witl.out intention of performance it is actionable fraud . . .
I: the jury determined that defendants knew or had good renson to believe that the acres they were selling were outside of the productive limits
of an oil field OT that they had no belief that the land sold was underll\in with oil in commercial quantities . . . then they were warranted in
findin, that defendant. had committed thett b1 falae pretense."
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defendant induced their [the complaining witnesses'] advancements of money upon the following representations: That
the business was 'a gold mine,' was 'making nothing but
money,' and 'there wasn't a chance of losing'; that the equipment of the firm 'was all paid for'; and that more money was
needed to secure new equipment." All of such representations obviously related to alleged existing facts, and were
false. There are similar wholly unnecessary expressions in
People v. Ames (1943), 61 Cal.App.2d 522, 531-532 [143
P.2rl 92] [the actual holding was that "Because a false statement of a present fact is coupled with a false promise of a
future act, it does not overcome the effect of the false pretense concerning the present fact"], and People v. Chamberlain (1950), 96 Cal.App.2d 178, 182 [214 P.2d 600] [a posi.
tive statement as to ownership of a horse]. All the cases cited
in this connection are, of course, out of line with the traditional view that proof of a false promise does not establish
the crime. They do not attempt to explain or disappro~l".
but simply ignore, those many other California cases which
hold in considered opinions that a false promise is not a false
pretense upon which a conviction of theft can be based.
The Weight of Authority

The traditional view that the representation must be of
a present or past fact, and that a mere promise to perform
an act in the future will not support a comlction, is e::rpres;;.,.d
in the following cases: People v. Wasservogle (1888). 7i Cal.
173, 174 [19 P. 270]; People v. Green (1913), 22 Cal..App
45, 48, 51 [133 P. 334] [conviction reversed because defendant's statements which induced victim to part with proper~y were promises, not misrepresentations of fact]; Peoplt
v. Kahler (1915),26 Ca1.App. 449, 452 [147 P. 228] [same};
In re James (1920), 47 Ca1.App. 205, 206 [190 P. 466!;
People v. Mace (1925), 71 Ca1.App. 10, 21 [234 P. 8411;
People v. Walker (1926), 76 Cal.App. 192, 205 [244 P.
94] : People v. Moore (1927), 82 Cal.App. 739, 746 [256 P.
266] ; People v. White (1927), 85 Ca1.App. 241, 250 [2:i9
P. 76] ; People v. Cale (1930), 106 Ca1.App.Supp. 7i7. 7~
[288 P. 430] [conviction reversed because representations were
in form of promises] ; People v. Robinson (1930). 107 ("at.
App. 211, 221 [290 P. 470] ; People v. Reese (1934), 136 Cal
App. 657. 663 [29 P.2d 450] [conviction reversed because represent:<n:1s ,rere l1!'i to futnre usc to be mnc1c of money] : P,o.
pIe v. Downing (1936),14 Cal.App.2d 392, 395 [58 P.2d 651j,
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petition for a rehearing was denie<1 March 17,
S~hn:lrr, J., were of the opiuion that
should be granted.

'8

. J., and

